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INTRODUCTION

High technology is a key component of U.S. world trade and critical to American political and economic influence in international affairs.' At the heart of high-technology is the semiconductor 2 industry
which is the "crude oil" for U.S. computer and telecommunication
markets. s
The United States' greatest competitor in the semiconductor industry is Japan.4 Through a strategy called "targeting," the Japanese
government, in collaboration with its leading high-tech firms,5 sought
preeminence in the semi-conductor industry.0 The Japanese firms
J.D. 1984, University of Florida.
1. U.S. Trade Relations with Japan, 1982: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1983) (statement of Robert W. Galvin, Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive of Motorola, Inc.).
2. For purposes of this commentary, the term semiconductor will be used interchangeably
with the term computer "chip." See McLellan, Microelectronics and the Law: More than
*

Meets the Eye, 87 CASE & COMMENT, Nov.-Dec., 1982, at 3. "Chips are encapsulated miniature

electronic circuits produced on a semiconductor crystal." Id. The chip this paper shall focus on
is the widely known random access memory (RAM) chip. "The 64k RAM (for example) is capable of storing 64,000 bits of memory on a piece of silicon just five milimeters square." Id.
3. U.S.-Japanese Trade Relations, 1979: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm.,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979) (statement of L.J. Sevin, Chief Executive Officer of Mostek
Corp.).
4. Options to Improve the Trade Remedy Laws, 1983: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Trade of House Comm. on Ways & Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1983) (statement of Robert
W. Galvin, Chief Executive of Motorola, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Options Hearings].
5. Among Japan's leading high-tech firms which produce Random Access Memory (RAM)
chips are: Hitachi, NEC, Fujitzu, Mitsubishi, Old and Toshiba. See Silicon Valley Has a Big
Chip About Japan, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1982, at 69.
6. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
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have achieved a dominant position in the world market for Random
Access Memory (RAM) computer chips.7 Furthermore, Japanese aggressive trading practices present a serious challenge to the viability
of the U.S. semiconductor industry.8
U.S. semiconductor firms, on the other hand, have accused the
Japanese high-tech industry of receiving unfair government subsidies
and practicing predatory pricing to undermine American markets."
There are two primary corrective mechanisms available to the industry under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) °
and the Trade Agreement Act of 1979 (TAA). 11 These are the antidumping statutes 1 2 and countervailing duty statutes."3 U.S. semiconductor firms, however, remain greatly reluctant to file any formal
action against the Japanese. 1 4 As this paper will point out, this reluctance is due largely to the inadequacy of these laws in dealing with
the trading problems of the rapid-paced semiconductor industry.1 5
To date several bills have been proposed in Congress to confront
the unfair trading practices facing the semiconductor industry and
other U.S. economic sectors.16 One of the most significant bills is the
Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act, which seeks to eliminate international trade barriers and permit American industry to compete on
an equal basis.1 7 There have also been several bilateral talks between
the U'S. and Japan to reduce trade friction in the semiconductor in7. See Japan, U.S. Gird for Micro-Chip War, Wall St. J., May 11, 1983, at 39, col. 2;
Silicon Valley Has a Big Chip About Japan, supra note 5, at 69.
8. See infra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
9. Options Hearings, supra note 4, at 46.
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. Complete text in force as of March 1, 1969, is reprinted in 4 GEtNERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE. BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMErS at 1-76
(1980). The G.A.T.T. is a multinational agreement which is dedicated to liberalizing international trade. See generally J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 396-432 (1977).
11. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
12. The Antidumping statutes are provided for in Agreement on Implementations of Article VI of the G.A.T.T.; Title VII of the Trade Agreement Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677
(1979).
13. The Countervailing Duty Statutes are provided for in Agreement on Interpretations
and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the G.A.T.T.; and Title VII of the Trade
Agreement Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1677 (1979).
14. Telephone interview with Susan Crawford, Commerce Department, Import Administration (February 29, 1984). See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
15.
16.

See infra notes 54-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.

17. Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act, 1982: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on IndustrialTrade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983) (statement of
Senator Danforth, Chairman of International Trade Subcommittee) [hereinafter cited as Danforth Hearings].
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dustry.'8 This paper shall examine the adequacy of these current and
proposed remedies in protecting the U.S. semiconductor industry.

II.

THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE

The United States Semiconductor Industry Association (S.I.A.)"'
asserts that the greatest challenge which confronts U.S. high technology today is "targeting" by foreign governments. 2 0 According to the
S.I.A., beginning in the mid-1970's the Japanese government, in an
effort to obtain dominance in high technology, placed the U.S. semiconductor industry at the "bullseye" of its targeting strategy.2' Under
this long-term strategy, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade
and Industry created a joint government-industry program to promote its high-technology industries. 2 Through a project called Very
Large Scale Integration (VLSI), a cartel was arranged whereby the
leading Japanese high-tech companies shared the costs and results of
research and development. 3 VLSI allowed each firm to produce new
technological products at a much lower cost than their American
counterparts, who had to conduct research and development independently of each other. 4 Furthermore, Japan not only exempted
these industries from antitrust laws but encouraged development
through tax incentives and other governmental financial assistance. 25
According to the S.I.A., the Japanese government took another
key step to protect its infant high-tech firms by placing substantial
restrictions on American penetration into their domestic markets. 6
Without the strong competition of American high-tech industry, the
27
Japanese were able to foster a strong semiconductor industry.
18.

See infra notes 127-134 and accompanying text.

19. The Semiconductor Industry Association has 54 member firms and represents the majority of U.S. merchant and captive producers of semiconductors. See Reciprocal Trade and
Market Access Legislation, 1982: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House

Comm. on Ways & Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1982) (statement of George Scalise, Senior
Vice President, of Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. on behalf of the Semiconductor Industry Association) (hereinafter cited as Market Access Legislation Hearings). Merchant producers sell
their semiconductors to other firms, whereas captive producers make semiconductors to be used
in their own products. Japan, U.S. Gird for Microchip War, Wall St. J., May 11, 1983, at 39,

col. 2.
20.
21.

Danforth Hearings supra note 17, at 119.
U.S.-Japanese Trade Relations, 1979: HearingsBefore the Joint Economic Comm.,

96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979) (statement of L.J. Sevin, Chief Executive Officer of Mostek
Corp.).
22.

Danforth Hearings,supra note 17, at 120; see also Options Hearings,supra note 4, at

23.
24.

Danforth Hearings,supra note 17, at 120.
Id.

359.

25.

Options Hearings,supra note 4, at 362.

26.
27.

Danforth Hearings, supra note 17, at 120-121.
Id.
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The Japanese high-tech firms entered the market for the 16k
RAM chip in the late 1970's. 28 Although they were late starters in the
16k RAM business, by 1980 they had captured 40 percent of the U.S.
market for this chip. 29 The Japanese firms, as part of a long-term
plan, undercut American prices and intentionally sacrificed immediate profits for a large market share in the future.3 0
The next memory chip battle between the U.S. and Japan centered around the 64k RAM chip which came into mass production in
1981. By the end of that year, the Japanese had captured 70 percent
of the world market for the 64k RAM chip and continue to hold that
position today.3 ' Due to the aggressive Japanese competition, American companies began to drop out of the memory chip market.3 2 Although 12 to 15 U.S. firms competed in the 16k RAM market, only
five remained for the 64k RAM war.3 3 Prices for these chips dropped
from $25 to $30 per unit to approximately $5 by 1982.11
It is important to note that semiconductor firms can be certain of
two events: 1) competition will inevitably drive prices downward; and
2) products will be rendered obsolete. within a few years due to the
technological pace of the industry.35 The S.I.A. concedes that the
competitive nature of the industry causes prices to have a predictable
downward trend. When the Japanese entered the 64k market in 1981,
prices plummeted to unprecedented levels. 6
The accusations of unfair Japanese trade practices in the semi28. Id.
29. Japan'sBatteringRams, THE ECONOMIST, June 13, 1981, at 70. One of the reasons the
Japanese were able to capture 40% of the 16k RAM market is that American firms could not
meet the demand and the Japanese companies picked up the overflow. Id.
30. Japan'sSemiconductor Exports - Is it a Chip Off U.S. Shoulders?, DATA MANAGEMENT, Oct., 1981, at 53; but see Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1982, at 33, col. 1. The belief that the
Japanese are less interested in profits than Americans is a misconception. According to industry
analysts, the Japanese are making semiconductors for less money than American firms. Therefore Japanese companies can sell their chips at a much lower cost and still make a profit. Id.
31. Danforth Hearings,supra note 17, at 122; see also ELECMONIc NEWS, Aug. 8, 1983, at
Supp. P.
32. Japan, U.S. Gird for Micro-Chip War, Wall St. J., May 11, 1983, at 39, col. 2.
33. Options Hearings, supra note 4, at 363.
34. Danforth Hearings, supra note 17, at 122; see also Silicon Valley Has a Big Chip
About Japan, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1982, at 69.
35. J. Alic, M. Harris and R. Miller, Microelectronics: Technological and Structural
Change, prepared for the Conference on Microelectronics in Transition: Industrial Transformation and Social Change, Univ. of California, Santa Cruz (May 12-15, 1983) at 13 (available
through Office of Technology Assessment, Washington D.C. 20510) [hereinafter cited as "Alic
Study"].
36. Danforth Hearings,supra note 17, at 122. Normally the price per computer chip declined at a rate of 30 percent when production was doubled. This rate of decline remained
constant despite recession, "competitive ferment within the U.S. semiconductor industry, etc."
When the Japanese launched their export drive into the 64k RAM market, however, the prices
fell 250 percent. Id.
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conductor industry became widespread when it was apparent that
U.S. firms had lost the 64k RAM war (1981-1982). The semiconductor industry believes that it is facing the same Japanese trading strategies which injured the U.S. automobile, television and steel industries 37 The accusations have been of the following nature. First, the

Japanese semiconductor industries, through unfair use of government
subsidies and predatory pricing have illegally undermined the U.S.
market in violation of the countervailing duty and antidumping laws
in the GATT and the U.S. Trade Agreements Act of 1979."8 Second,
the Japanese are placing too many restrictions on access to their domestic markets. 39 The U.S. semiconductor industry contends that
these trade and investment restrictions have stifled U.S. competition
and endangered the viability of an industry dependent on foreign
40
markets.

Some of the trade problems faced by the semiconductor industry
were due in part to the last recession. It would be a misconception,
however, to believe that all of the problems are temporary in nature.
Now confronted with fewer American competitors, Japanese industries are on the verge of winning the battle over the newest generation of chips, the 256k RAM.41 Industry analysts believe that a loss in
the 256k market will ultimately deal a heavy blow to American firms
in other areas of the semiconductor industry and fuel the fires for
protectionism.4 2 The growing U.S. trade deficit with Japan in high
technology products is also of great concern. Currently, the United
States buys approximately 1.1 billion dollars worth of semiconductors
from Japan. The U.S. however, sells only a little over five hundred
million dollars worth of semiconductors to Japan."
The nation which wins the semiconductor race will also be in a
dominant position across the entire spectrum of the high technology
37.

U.S.-Japanese Trade Relations, 1979: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm.,

supra note 3, at 22; see also Batt, Chips Seen Key to IndustrialSupremacy, CoMPUTERWORLD,
Dec. 20, 1982, at 45.
38. Options Hearings, supra note 4, at 46-47; see also S.I.A. Postpones Unfair Trade
Practices Complaint Against Japan,ELECTRONIC NEws, July 25, 1983, at Supp. J.
39. Danforth Hearings, supra note 17, at 123.
40. Market Access Legislation Hearings, supra note 19, at 102.
41. Japan, U.S. Gird for Micro-Chip War, supra note 32, at 39, col. 2.
42. Id.
43. U.S. JapaneseEconomic Relations, 1981: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Trade, Finance & Security Economics of the Joint Economic Comm., 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1981) (statement of Malcolm Badrige, Ex-secretary of Commerce).
44. Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1984, at 8, col. 1. Pursuant to telephone conversation with Mr.
Timothy Richards, assistant to Alan Wolff, counsel to the SIA (Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard and
McPherson in Washington, D.C.): Japanese semiconductor exports to the U.S. exceed U.S.
semiconductor exports to Japan by a 2 to 1 margin.
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market.4 With all these chips at stake the industry
be expected to vigorously pursue remedies under the
trade law. Surprisingly, the semiconductor industry
reluctant to pursue any of the appropriate remedies
the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes."

[Vol. II

would certainly
GATT and U.S.
remains greatly
available under

III. THE ADEQUACY OF CURRENT REMEDIES UNDER THE GATT AND
TAA
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 (which Congress promulgated in response to
the Tokyo Round) are fundamentally committed to trade liberalization.47 Despite this commitment, both agreements contain two important safety valves for situations where an exporting nation is taking
advantage of free trade and materially injuring a nation's domestic
markets.
The first safety valve is the Antidumping Statute which is set out
in Article VI of the GATT and Title VII of the TAA. 48 Basically, the
Antidumping Statute allows the imposition of a duty on an imported
product if two requirements are met. First, the Commerce Department finds the exporting manufacturer is selling the product in the
importing nation's market at less than fair value," the amount the
product is sold for in the exporter's home market (dumping).50 Sec45. Batt, supra note 37, at 45.
46. Telephone interview with Susan Crawford, Commerce Department, Import Administration (Feb. 29, 1984). Although no actions have been filed by the semiconductor industry, in
December of 1983 E. F. Johnson Company, a United States producer of cell site transceivers
filed an antidumping petition with the Commerce Department against the Japanese company,
KoKusai. Basically, cell site transceivers are components for cellular mobile telephone systems
(car phones), which have greatly advanced this emerging industry. E.F. Johnson Co. has alleged
that due to predatory pricing by KoKusai, it was out-bid of a contract with Western Electric
and AT&T. Furthermore, E.F. Johnson alleges that KoKusai has caused or threatened material
injury to this infant U.S. cellular telecommunications industry. See In the Matter of Cell Site
Transceivers: Antidumping Petition on Behalf of E.F. Johnson Company (filed on December
28, 1983 before the U.S. Dept. of Commerce and I.T.C.).
47. MacDonnell, Offset Policy Under the New CountervailingLaw, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
429 (1982).
48. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the G.A.T.T.; Title VII of the T.A.A.,
19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677 (1979). See generally P. LLOYD, AN rIDUMPING ACTIONS AND THE GATT
SYSTEm (1977).
49. In order to determine "fair market value" it is necessary to compare foreign market
value with the U.S. price. Basically, the U.S. price is defined under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (1979) as,
"the purchase price, or the exporter's sales price, of the merchandise .... " "Foreign market
value" is defined under 19 U.S.C. 1677b(a)(1) (1979) as, "the price, at the time of exportation of
such merchandise to the United States." See also 19 C.F.R. § 353 (1980).
50. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1979). The basic procedure is as follows: Commencement of the
proceeding by the Commerce Secretary or the filing of a petition by an interested party (19
U.S.C. § 1673a); determination of sufficiency of petition by the Secretary (19 U.S.C. § 1673a);
preliminary determination on dumping by the Secretary within 160 days of the filing of petition
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ond, the International Trade Commission (ITC) determines that such
sales cause or threaten material injury" or materially retards the establishment of a U.S. industry.52 If the above two criteria (dumping
and material injury) are established, then an additional duty shall be
imposed on the product. The duty will be the amount by which the
nation's market value exceeds the importing nation's
exporting
53
market.
The second safety valve under current law is the countervailing
duty statute (CVD) which is provided for in Title VII of the TAA,
implementing Article VII of the GATT.5 The CVD law provides for
the imposition of an offset against the foreign subsidization of exported products under certain circumstances. First, the Commerce
Department determines that a country, person or corporation is providing a direct or indirect subsidy "5 for the exportation of goods. 56
Second, the ITC determines that the subsidization has caused 57or
threatened material injury or materially retarded a U.S. industry.
As already stated, no actions have been filed by the semiconductor industry under either of these statutes. This does not prove that
the Japanese trade practices do not fall under the antidumping or
countervailing duty statutes. This legal inaction simply illustrates the
ineffectiveness of the statutes both as a deterrent and remedy for the
unfair trade practices committed upon the semiconductor industry.5"
The adequacy of the antidumping statute shall be examined first.
IV.

ADEQUACY

OF ANTIDUMPING STATUTES

Proving the first element of the antidumping statute requires the
comparison of foreign market value with the U.S. price.59 It is an ex(19 U.S.C. § 1673b); final determination by the Secretary within 75 days of an affirmative preliminary determination (19 U.S.C. § 1673d); publication of the antidumping duty order (19
U.S.C. § 1673e). See also 19 C.F.R. § 353 (1980).
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1979). Material injury is defined as, "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant." Id.
52. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a-e (1979). The International Trade Commission conducts its preliminary and final determinations on material injury simultaneously with the Secretary's proceedings. Id.
53. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1979).
54. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
G.A.T.T.; Title VII of the T.A.A., 19 U.S.C. § 1671, 1677 (1979).
55. The term "subsidy" is defined under 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1979) as "bounty" or
"grant."
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1979). The processing of a CVD petition parallels the processing
of an antidumping petition. The Commerce Secretary and ITC conduct their preliminary and
final determinations simultaneously. See id. § 1671(a)-(e). See also 19 C.F.R. § 355 (1980).
57. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)-(e).
58. See infra notes 60-87 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 49.
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tremely difficult task, however, to compare the Japanese market
value with the U.S. market value of semiconductors.6 0 Semiconductors, especially memory chips, have a downward trend in price and
market value fluctuates constantly. Another reason it is difficult to
ascertain a market value comparison is because Japanese prices for
semiconductors are treated as confidential by both the government
and industry.61 Even where price lists for Japanese semiconductors
are available, they are often inaccurate.6 2 Unavailability of information makes proving that the Japanese firms have dumped computer
chips into our markets a difficult task and perhaps is a reason behind
the U.S. semiconductor firms' reluctance to bring suit.
Proving material injury to the American semiconductor industry
is an easier task. The Japanese firms captured a 40 percent share of
the U.S. 16k RAM market, a 70 percent share of the 64k RAM market and are currently threatening to dominate the 256k market. If
the Japanese firms continue to dominate the RAM market, the U.S.
63
firms may have to bow out of the production of memory chips.

High-tech analysts believe if U.S. firms stop producing memory
chips, they will lose the edge they currently retain in other areas of
the semiconductor industry, such as microprocessors.4 The reason
for this is that a great deal of the discovery that occurs in making all
types of computer chips is accomplished while making memory chips
such as the RAMs. 5
Even if it cannot actually be proven that Japanese firms have
dumped computer chips in our market, it seems clear that their competition has indeed caused or threatened material injury to the semiconductor industry. Furthermore, the financial beating which some
American semiconductor firms sustained in the RAM markets has
caused them to drop out of the market.66 This probably would come
within the scope of the antidumping statute's provision
for the "ma'67
terial retardation of an industry's establishment.

Assuming the U.S. semiconductor industry could overcome the
60. Telephone interview with Mr. Charles Ludolf, Department of Commerce, Import Administration (Feb. 29, 1984).
61. Id. See also Options Hearings,supra note 4, at 47.
62. Telephone interview with Charles Ludolf, Department of Commerce, Import Administration (Feb. 29, 1984).
63. Japan, U.S. Gird for Micro-Chip War, supra note 32, at 39, col. 2.
64. Id. Interestingly, the RAMs make up only one-third of memory sales and memory
sales only comprise one-fifth of all semiconductor sales. Nevertheless the RAMs are quite im-

portant because of their profitability and their importance to the making of other types of
computer chips. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
67. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1979).
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difficult barrier of demonstrating dumping and also prove material
injury, the industry would still be reluctant to bring suit under the
current statutes. Due to the pace of technological change in the industry, relief under the statutes may take too long. 8 The product life
cycle of most chips such as the RAMs is three to five years before
they become obsolete.69 This rapid obsolescence0 is due to the competitive and evolutionary nature of the industry.
Consider the case of a dumped computer chip which may already
have been in mass production for one or two years before the statutory level of causing or threatening material injury to the industry
has been reached. Once the antidumping portion is filed, the Commerce Department and the ITC carry on separate but concurrent investigations.7 1 Assuming the case is not overly complex (which semiconductor cases certainly are) and a dumping order is issued, another
year has gone by.72 Thus, by the time relief would be available to the

semiconductor industry, the chip may be obsolete.
There were approximately 200 antidumping and countervailing
duty suits filed by U.S. industries in 1982.73 A major portion of these
cases were filed by U.S. steel companies.74 The antidumping and
CVD statutes are more effective in this type of industry because the
market for steel is going to remain relatively unchanged.75 Duties imposed for past and present statutory violations in an unchanging
market will also have a restricting effect on foreign violators' future
trade with the same market. 6 In an unchanging industry such as
steel, the dumping and CVD statutes serve as a more effective deterrent and remedy than in the rapidly changing market of
semiconductors.
The following scenario of Japanese practices illustrates the ineffectiveness of current law in a rapidly changing industry. Japanese
companies dump off computer chips and place the profits into research and development in order to develop a new generation of com68. Alic Study, supra note 35, at 19.

69. Telephone interview with Mr. John Alic, research consultant for the Office of Technology Assessment, Washington D.C. (Feb. 15, 1984).
70. See generally Alic Study, supra note 35.
71. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(d) (1979).

72. Telephone interview with Ms. Susan Crawford, Dept. of Commerce (Feb. 29, 1984).
Under 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(c)(1), the "administering authority can postpone making a prelimi-

nary determination up to 210 days after the filing of the petition if the case is 'extraordinarily
complicated."' Cases brought by the semiconductor industry would very possibly fall under
this category.

73.

Reference File, Int'l. Trade Rep., U.S. Import. WKLY., Dumping Duties; at 11 (1983).

74.

Id.

75. McClellan, supra note 2, at 4.
76.

Id.
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puter chips. This practice allows the Japanese firms to get to the
market with their new chips ahead of the U.S. firms, thereby dominating the new market and knocking out U.S. competition. 7 7 By the
time a remedy is imposed, the generation of chips which the Japanese are accused of dumping has become obsolete and they are al78
ready on the next generation of chips.
V.

ADEQUACY OF COUNTERVAILING DUTY STATUTES

The Tokyo Round made significant achievements in distinguishing between permissible domestic subsidies and impermissible export
subsidies.7 The GATT recognized that subsidies are crucial to advancing a nation's economic goals and endorsed certain types of domestic subsidies.8 0 Although the GATT did not specifically define export subsidy, it listed such subsidies rather broadly to include any
aid by the government which benefits exported goods.81 The distinction between domestic and export subsidies, however, is difficult and
often illusory.8 2 "In effect, GATT proscribes direct export subsidies
while embracing indirect export subsidies that masquerade as domestic subsidies."8 3
The semiconductor industry has filed no countervailing duty suits
for basically the same reasons it has not filed antidumping suits,
namely, the time constraints of the problem and the inadequacy of
relief by statute. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Japan's joint government-industry project in the semiconductor industry would
clearly fall under the CVD statutes. The Japanese government not
only encouraged the VLSI research cartel, but also gave it financial
assistance and tax incentives. The Japanese contend that this project
is "GATT-legal" and for long-term research.' It does not appear,
however, that the Japanese can credibly argue that such subsidies are
77. Id.
78. Id. See also Alic Study, supra note 35, at 19. It should be noted, however, that under
19 U.S.C. § 1673, the antidumping statute applies to a "class or kind of foreign merchandise"
being sold in the U.S. at less than fair market value. It seems that the U.S. semiconductor
industry could contend that the 64k RAM chips which were allegedly dumped are of the same
class or kind as the previous generation of chips which were allegedly dumped. Thus, when a
remedy is imposed even if the last generation of chips are obsolete, it would apply to the new
generation of chips as well.
79. United States/Common Market Agricultural Trade and the GATT Framework, 5
Nw. J. ITr'L L. & Bus. 326 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Agricultural Trade].
80. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, art. 11(1), reprinted in G.A.T.T.,
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 69.
81. Agricultural Trade, supra note 79, at 331.
82. Id.

83. Id.
84. Japan EIA Hits SIA Claim of Targeting Semikon Mkt., ELECTRONIC NEWS, Mar. 14,
1983, at 4.
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for domestic purposes only, in an industry whose viability is dependent upon exportation.
One of the key problems behind the CVD statute is that the duties imposed would not adequately reflect the actual benefit the Japanese chip has reaped from subsidization.8 5 For example, the benefits
from the Japanese government subsidized research cartel are immeasurable. The VLSI project has allowed the Japanese firms to carry
out research and development at a fraction of the cost it would take
to carry it out independently." Yet only the "seed money" for such a
project can be offset under the CVD statute which would only result
87
in a nominal tariff on the imported chips.
In 1982 the Semiconductor Industry Association turned down a
call by some of its American firms to file an industry-wide complaint
charging the Japanese industries with dumping 64k RAMs.8 8 The petition was turned down because as one S.I.A. director stated, "it was
decided it would not be prudent."8 9 The main reason behind the decision was that several member firms of the S.I.A. were not involved
in the production of memory chips.9 0 Those firms did not feel the
Japanese challenge as acutely as the RAM-producing firm. They simply did not want to support a costly dumping lawsuit."
Another reason for the reluctance of U.S. semiconductor firms to
take formal action is because of the economic interdependence between the U.S. and Japan in certain areas of high-technology.9 2 Companies engaged in bitter trade disputes in one part of the world may
establish joint ventures elsewhere. 3 In short, some semiconductor
firms do not want to press formal trade actions because they fear
94
retaliation by the Japanese industry and government.
At present, American semiconductor companies are waiting to see
85.
86.
87.

Options Hearings,supra note 4, at 36-41; see also id. at 47.
Id. at 47.
Id. According to an S.I.A. study, the Japanese government gave its semiconductor

industry 500 million dollars in assistance between 1976-1982. However, during a 5-year period
the Japanese semiconductor industry shipped 25 billion dollars worth of chips. The countervailing duty would thus be very small and ineffective according to Mr. Galvin. Id.
88. Wightman, SIA Split on 64k RAM "Dump" Action: Expect Members to Petition,

ELECTRONIC NEws, Mar. 22, 1982, at 1.
89.
90.

Id. (Statement by Mr. Warren Davis, director of government relations for the SIA).
Id.

91. Id. The SIA decided to leave it up to its member companies to file petitions on an
individual basis. Id. Pursuant to telephone conversation with Mr. Charles Ludolf, Dept. of
Commerce, Import Administration (Feb. 15, 1984). Motorola has attempted to file actions
against the Japanese but these suits never came to fruition.

92. See Alic Study, supra note 35, at 19.
93.
94.

Id.
Telephone interview with John A. Alic, Office of Technology Assessment, Washington,

D.C., (Feb. 15, 1984).
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the developments of proposed congressional legislation and ongoing
U.S.-Japanese talks in the area of high technology.9 5 The S.I.A. is
delaying formal action in the hope that these proposals and negotiations *willprovide more viable remedies for the trade problems the
industry is facing.96

VI.

PROPOSALS AND NEGOTIATIONS

Due to the trade wars being waged in steel, automobiles, agriculture and high-technology, many believe the political climate is ripe
for protectionist action in the U.S. 9 7 A score of proposed trade bills
have been introduced in Congress over the last few years.9 However,
the legislation which the S.I.A. and other U.S. industries have supported is not protectionist in nature.99 These bills have focused on
gaining access to Japan's domestic markets by attempting to reduce
trade barriers.
The Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act (hereinafter Danforth
Bill)10 0 is a good example of the proposed congressional responses to
the trade problems of the semiconductor industry. Although the Bill
has not been enacted, it has passed the Senate twice and will be
reheard in March of 1984.101 The Danforth Bill is comprehensive in
its approach to the foreign trade disputes of practically all the U.S.
industries. Furthermore, it incorporates the key elements of the High
Technology Act 01° developed in part by the S.I.A. 0° The fundamental objective of the Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act is to elimi95. See e.g., SIA Postpones Unfair Trade Practices Complaint Against Japan, ELECTRoc NEWS, July 25, 1983, at Supp. J [hereinafter cited as SIA Postpones Complaint]. See
infra text accompanying notes 130-131.
96. S.I.A. Postpones Complaint, supra note 95, at Supp. J. See infra notes 99-135 and
accompanying text.
97. Kirchner, Selling High Technology, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 27, 1982, at 59.
98. McLellan, supra note 75, at 4.
99. Danforth Hearings, supra note 17, at 128; Options Hearings, supra note 4, at 374;
supra note 4.
100. The Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act was originally introduced into the Senate
as Bill Number S. 2094 in 1982. It was sponsored by Senators Danforth, Bentsen, Roth, Hart,
Chafee, Bradley, Heinz, Symms and Inouye. The Bill was reintroduced before the Senate as S.
144 in 1983. Although the Bill has passed the Senate twice, it has not passed the House where
it was introduced by Congressman Frenzel as H.R. 6773. Danforth Hearings,supra note 17, at
3.
101. Senator Danforth on behalf of the Reciprocal Trade Investment Act on C-Span, Feb.
29, 1984.
102. See Trade Barrier Bills Disputed in Congress, MINI-MIcRo WORLD, July, 1982, at
85. The Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act is coupled with the High Technology Trade Act (
S 2356) which is sponsored by Senators Hart, Cranston and Heinz. The semiconductor industry
supports both bills. Id. The High Tech Act has also been introduced in the House in 1982 as
H.R. 6433, H.R. 1571 (Jones Bill) and again in 1983 as H.R. 1052 (Shannon Bill).
103. Options Hearings,supra note 4, at 374.
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nate barriers to international trade so that American industry can
compete with other countries on an equal basis. 104 The principle be-

hind the Bill is to base U.S. import strategies upon our industries'
access to foreign markets. 105
The Danforth Bill provides for a broadening of current laws, but
only as an inducement or bargaining tool to ensure the elimination of
foreign barriers. 06 At the heart of the Bill is a provision which would
broaden and clarify Presidential authority to take remedial action
against unfair trade practices.10 7 Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act
(which was amended by Title IX of the 1979 TAA) is the current
provision which grants the President broad authority to retaliate
against unfair trade practices by foreign nations. °8 For example, in
response to a determination of unfair trade practices, the President
can raise import duties or impose other trade restrictions.1 0 It should
be noted that the Danforth Bill calls for a clarification and broadening of the President's section 301 powers, but only to the extent it is
not inconsistent with U.S. international obligations such as the
GATT.110
The Act would grant the President broader authority to negotiate
and enter into agreements in order to ensure access to foreign markets for U.S. trade and investment in high technology.1 Furthermore, there is a provision which would grant the President the auin exchange for equal
thority to cut tariffs on semiconductors
112
concessions by the Japanese.

If enacted, the Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act would certainly not bring an end to the trade problems the semiconductor industry is facing. 113 However, the Bill reflects a sounder philosophy
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Danforth Hearings, supra note 17, at 3-4.
Kirchner, supra note 97, at 62.
Danforth Hearings,supra note 17, at 4; see also id.
Id. at 5. (statement of Senator Danforth).
See Pub. L. No. 96-39, 19 U.S.C. J- .411-2416 (1979).
19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (2) (1979).
Danforth Hearings, supra note 17, at 51.
Id. at 5 (statement of Senator Danforth); see also Options Hearings,supra note 4, at

374.
112. Danforth Hearings, supra note 17, at 128; see also Reciprocal Trade and Market
Access Legislation, 1982: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1982) (statement of George Scalise, Senior Vicepresident; Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., on behalf of the S.I.A.).
113. Danforth Hearings,supra note 17, at 4.
Editor's Note to the Reader:
Since the writing of this article, the proposed Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act has
been incorporated into the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 adopted by Congress at 19 Stat 573.
See in particular Title III of the Act entitled the International Trade and Investment Act.
Section 308 of the Act provides for Presidential authority to enter into the "Negotiation of
Agreements Concerning High Technology Industries."
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and more realistic approach than that of protectionism. There are
those who believe that the only solution to America's trade problems
is to erect barriers against foreign imports. The Danforth Bill takes
the opposite view and espouses the idea that American industry can
produce as fine a product as the Japanese and can compete favorably,
providing all countries are willing to play by the same rules. " 4
The Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act is certainly not a radical departure from current trade laws. The Act would be more responsive to the Japanese challenge than current laws available to the
semiconductor industry. Overall, the Act encourages the President to
make a greater effort to be the self-initiator of section 301 actions
instead of being the mere recipient of such cases.11 5 Furthermore, the
Bill presumably provides for broader section 301 authority only as a
bargaining tool to achieve fairer trade practices by foreign governments. 6 It is certainly hoped that the Act would not allow for "strict
reciprocity" in the sense that the U.S. could mirror the unfair trade
practices of foreign governments. " This would only defeat the purpose of the Bill and exacerbate the ongoing trade wars in hightechnology.11 8
Furthermore, by concentrating on the reduction of foreign trade
barriers, the Bill would also indirectly curb dumping practices by
other nations. For an exporting manufacturer to be able to dump
products, its home market must be compartmentalized from the nation into which it is dumping.1 1 9 Trade barriers prevent the cheaper
dumped product from reentering the home market where prices for
the same product are higher.1 20 Thus, if the Reciprocity Bill could
eliminate Japanese trade barriers, it would ultimately take away the
exporting manufacturers' opportunity to dump semiconductors into
the U.S.
Certainly not all the problems which the U.S. semiconductor industry faces were caused by Japanese trading practices. Some of the
answers to these problems lie within the industry itself and through
government assistance.1 2 ' In 1983 President Reagan transmitted to
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
J. VINER, DUMPING: A

118.
PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 94-101 (1923); see also, J.
JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 693 (1977).

119. J. VINER, supra note 118, at 94-101.
120. See, e.g., U.S. Trade Relations with Japan, 1982: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1983) (statement of Chairman, Senator
Charles H. Percy).
121. The NationalProductivity and Innovation Act of 1983, Message from the President
of U.S., Transmitted to Congress, Sept. 13, 1983.
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Congress the National Productivity and Innovation Act.1 22 Proposed
Title II of this Act is designed to encourage joint research and development projects by exempting such ventures from antitrust laws. 123

The proposal is intended to create more efficient and competitive
U.S. industries similar to that of the Japanese research cartels. Ironically, the Japanese R & D cartels have been criticized by the U.S. as
being a violation of4 antitrust laws or being inconsistent with princi12
ples of fair trade.

The same objectives of reciprocal trade legislation have also been
sought at the bilateral and multilateral negotiation level. In November of 1982 the signatories of the GATT met in Geneva in an attempt
to halt protectionism and reduce trade barriers. 125 The U.S. delegation, led by Trade Ambassador Brock, wanted to begin talks about
including special provisions on high-technology within the GATT. 6
Not only did the proposal meet with great resistence by the other
countries, but the Conference seemed to point out the
fragility of the
1 27
GATT as a mechanism for free international trade.

The bilateral talks between the U.S. and Japan on trade disputes
in the high-tech industry have been more successful. In 1982 the
U.S.-Japan Work Group on High Technology was established. 28 The
bilateral work group has met several times and developed recommendations which both governments have endorsed. 29 The recommendations are fundamentally the same as the objectives of the reciprocal
trade legislation and include: the opportunity for U.S. firms to participate in the Japanese high-tech Research and Development programs; and, the formation of a monitoring program for trade statistics on Japanese sales of semiconductors.130
Interestingly, in July of 1983, the S.I.A. postponed an unfair trade
practices complaint against Japan, citing the favorable results of
talks by the Work Group as a primary reason. s The Japanese gov122. Id.
123.

Options Hearings, supra note 4, at 46.

124. Kirchner, supra note 97, at 59.
125.

Id. at 60.

126. Id.
127.

See Helping High Tech Firms into the JapaneseMarket, Bus. AA., July 25, 1983, at

2.

128. Id.
129.

Id. See also Recommendations of U.S.-Japan High-Tech Work Group, Bus. A.L,

Mar. 7, 1983, at 3.
130. SIA Postpones Complaint, supra note 95, at Supp. J.
131. Id. On June 24, 1985, a microchip manufacturer, Micron Technology Inc., filed the
first formal complaint ever filed by an American semiconductor company. The complaint,
which was filed with the International Trade Commission and Commerce Department, charges
the Japanese with the "dumping" and "predatory pricing" of random access memory chips into
American markets. Other formal complaints by U.S. semiconductor companies may follow. N.Y.
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ernment purportedly agreed to concrete measures to increase importation of U.S. semiconductors. 132 Nevertheless, skepticism by the
semiconductor industry remains.13 3 Having seen no tangible signs
that the Japanese are implementing the agreements of the work
group, one spokesman for the S.I.A. commented: "These developments lead us to fear the Japanese economic system. In short, we feel
we still have a long way to go."' 13 4 Nevertheless, the work-group will
continue to meet in the future and the lines for negotiation must remain open to curb unfair trade practices and encourage easier access
to Japanese high-tech markets.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because of the technological pace of the semiconductor industry,
current trade laws do not offer an effective response to the unfair
trade practices confronting this industry. Despite or because of this
unresponsiveness, new remedies are being sought. After the failures
encountered at the 1982 Geneva Convention of the GATT, there remains a question as to whether the GATT has "outlived its usefullness."1 5 In response, Ambassador Brock stated, "The advantage is
awesome for the U.S. to be a member of GATT. If we didn't have a
GATT we'd have to invent a GATT." 3
In effect, the objectives behind the Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act is a reinvention of the GATT's committment to trade liberalization. Due to the highly competitive nature of the semiconductor
industry, claims of unfair trade practices will continue in the future.
Nevertheless, reciprocal trade legislation and ongoing negotiations
with Japan present a more flexible response to the trade problems of
the semiconductor industry than do current laws. If the Danforth Bill
is adopted, it is important that the Bill be used to legitimately seek
reduction of trade barriers instead of being used merely as a mechanism for retaliation. Protectionism is not the solution for an industry
which is dependent upon the ability to compete on a global scale.
Times, June 27, 1985, at 31.
On January 22, 1986, the International Trade Commission, in a unanimous decision, made a
preliminary finding that the Japanese are "dumping" 256K memory chips into American markets. Surprisingly, the complaint had been filed by the Reagan Administration rather than the
semiconductor industry itself. The investigation will be sent to the Commerce Department.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1986, at 31.
132. S.LA.: Japan Gov't Threat to Fair Competition, ELECTRONIC NEWS, June 27, 1983,
at 54.
133. Id. (Statement by Mr. James Asher, Vice President of Harris Corp. and Spokesman
for S.I.A.).
134. Kirchner, supra note 97, at 66.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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